Abstract-We construct a novel data set matching occupational data from separate establishments to the establishments' corporate parents, in order to study labor market links across establishments within diverse firms. We find substantial wage components common to all establishments within firms, even after netting out industry and occupation effects. However, employment changes are localized to establishments. The data suggest that internal labor markets of multiestablishment firms are linked throughout their entire organizations, but that establishment-level demand shocks do not permeate the firm.
I. Introduction
S ome of the most fundamental questions in economics involve the boundaries of the firm. Although some firms are small and easy to categorize, others are diverse with many establishments operating in different industries with different types of employees. We assemble a unique data set that links the labor market information of individual establishments to their ultimate beneficial owners in order to study the labor markets of firms with complex organizational structures.
In table 1, we illustrate the potential for complex organizational structures within firms by providing a partial list of industries in which General Electric participates, as derived from publicly available data (Corporate Affilations Plus, 2000) . 1 As is clear from table 1, General Electric operates in a diverse range of durable and nondurable manufacturing industries, as well as in finance and service industries. One would assume a light-bulb manufacturing plant is a very different environment from an aircraft-engine manufacturing plant, which is in turn very different from a television network or a life-insurance division. Despite the apparent differences across business lines, General Electric is famous for being an integrated organization.
One reason firms like General Electric may diversify is the existence of input-market complementarities across business lines within firms; a set of inputs may be particularly productive when linked under the same firm. Acemoglu (1999) , for example, posits a model in which capital and an employee's skill are complements. Firms that opt for large investments in capital therefore create jobs exclusively for high-skilled employees. 2 In a world of complex organizational structures, however, one might ask whether capital (or some other firmwide decision) could link the hiring decisions of a large firm across apparently unrelated divisions.
Suppose, however, that some characteristics of diversified firms like GE (such as capital, management style, or corporate culture) do differentially affect the productivity of lowand high-skilled employees throughout the entire firm. These characteristics might affect which industries these diversified firms choose to enter. For example, a firm may choose only to enter industries that require high-skilled employees. This firm may also search for higher-skilled employees than its competitors in each industry. If an econometric analysis cannot control perfectly for employee productivity, the hiring of higher-skilled employees may show up as higher wages. Rent sharing [which is also a feature of the Acemoglu (1999) model] may also cause some firms to pay high wages across all industries, assuming that rents are shared at the firm level rather than at the establishment level or the division level.
Given the discussion above, an interesting empirical question is whether one can find any similarities across apparently unrelated divisions in a large firm. In other words, can we find any evidence that these large and diverse firms are really integrated organizations? In this paper, we address this issue by analyzing how similar wage and employment policies appear across establishments and industries within large diversified firms. We study both the choices of industries for these firms and their chosen wage and employment policies compared to their competitors in the same industries.
To our knowledge, we are the first to study the labor markets across establishments and industries within firms. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) , for example, use the firm as the unit of analysis, implicitly relying on the wage policies across all establishments and industries within a firm being uniform. Other studies, such as Groshen (1991) and Bronars and Famulari (1997) , use the establishment as the unit of analysis and must ignore the fact that multiple establishments might share a common owner.
Although we are the first to disentangle the separate effects of firm and establishment affiliation, there exists some indirect evidence that wage decisions or hiring decisions are influenced both by establishment-specific factors and by firmwide factors. Brown and Medoff (1989) and Troske (1999) show that cross-sectional wages are positively correlated with both establishment size and firm size.
These results suggest that either wage policies or hiring policies are determined both by establishment-specific factors and by firmwide factors. The purpose of our paper is to address this issue directly.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section II, we describe our data. In section III, we investigate the above issues by examining firms that operate in more than one industry. Such firms tend to enter either industries with high-skill occupations or industries with low-skill occupations, but tend not to enter both high-skill industries and low-skill industries. We also show that firms tend to enter only high-wage industries or only low-wage industries, even after netting out the industries' occupational distributions.
In section IV, we describe the model of wage determination that we estimate and briefly describe our technique for estimating the correlations of wages across establishments, net of observable characteristics such as occupation and industry. In section V, we present the results of estimating this model as well as an analogous model for changes in employment. We find that wage changes and employment changes are not correlated across industries within a firm. However, even after controlling for fixed industry effects, occupation effects, and other covariates, we find that wage levels for all jobs throughout all business lines in a firm are correlated. That is, we estimate a common component to wages throughout a diversified firm, even when comparing different jobs in different establishments in different industries. In section VI, we present some conclusions as well as directions for future research.
II. Data: The National Compensation Survey
The National Compensation Survey (NCS) is an establishment wage survey designed to generate a nationally representative random sample of job cells within establishments (see U.S. Department of Labor, 1997) . A job cell is the most narrowly defined job level recognized by the establishment's job title classification. Our wage observations are the average hourly wages for all employees within an establishment who work in a particular job cell. We typically observe multiple job cells within an establishment.
The survey encompasses large establishments in the nonagricultural, nonfederal economy. Private households and establishments with fewer than 50 employees are not eligible. Field economists visit sampled establishments at survey initiation and obtain information on the establishment and on a sample of jobs in the establishment. Because industry coding is done at the establishment level, we often observe multiple industries within a multiestablishment firm. The survey is longitudinal, with annual survey updates conducted via mail and telephone.
Establishment information in the NCS includes establishment employment, location, industry, and employer identification number (EIN). These data elements come from the sampling frame and are verified by field economists. Jobspecific information includes a census occupational classification (421 categories in our data), earnings data, and work schedule information. Earnings are defined as regular payments from the employer to the employee as compensation for straight-time hourly work, or for any salaried work performed. Earnings include incentive pay and production bonuses such as commissions and piece rates. Earnings exclude premium pay for overtime, holiday, and weekend work; shift differentials; bonuses not directly tied to production; payments by third parties such as tips or referral incentives; and payments in kind such as room and board. Scheduled hours per week are measured and exclusive of overtime for hourly workers; for salaried workers actual hours typically worked are measured. Earnings are converted to a dollars-per-hour basis using the work schedule information. Our wage measure is the log of the average wage rate among workers in the job, deflated using the CPI-U to 1999 dollars.
For the purposes of the NCS, establishments are economic units producing goods or services, auxiliary units providing support services, or central administrative offices. Figure 1 gives a schematic relating establishment and firm definitions in our data. For private-sector industries in this survey, establishments are usually at a single physical location. EINs on the database allow us to link different establishments that have common ownership. Establishments in the same firm, however, can have different EINs; any subsidiary firms, even if they are fully owned by the parent firm, receive separate EINs. We link EINs that are owned by the same parent firm using data from Corporate Affiliations Plus (1998) . 3 Most previous labor-economics researchers have used either data with establishment identifiers (not linking establishments with common ownership) or data with firm identifiers defined using the EIN (thereby not linking different EINs with common ownership).
We utilize extracts from the 1997 and 1998 NCS samples. We restrict the data to include private-sector establishments only. We keep observations that can be matched across years, losing approximately 20% of the 1997 sample observations to attrition. We also exclude data from singleestablishment firms, because we are particularly interested in characterizing the correlations of wages across establishments within the same firm. 4 This restriction results in an additional 60% decrease in our sample size. Minor exclusions include deleting observations with missing occupation codes, missing industry codes, or changing firm identifiers. Because the exclusions in total are substantial, we estimate the parameters of interest using unweighted data. 5 Table 2 presents definitions and summary statistics for our data. After making all of the exclusions mentioned above, we have wage data from 34,746 job cells. These data come from 4,257 establishments and 1,015 firms. Observing wages from multiple establishments within a firm is an important advantage over previous work. The sampled employment in these job cells is approximately 1.3 million workers in 1997. We observe 455 firms operating in more than one three-digit industry, and we observe 258 firms operating in more than one major industry classification. 6 The major weakness of our data compared to data used in Abowd et al. (1999) and others is that we have little information on employees. The data follow jobs-but not individuals-longitudinally. When we observe an establishment that pays high wages, we therefore cannot determine whether its employees also received high wages when employed in other firms. We also do not observe worker demographics and productivity-related characteristics such as schooling.
Inasmuch as our panel is based on significant exclusions from the NCS, table 2 also presents statistics comparing our sample with the full 1997 NCS cross section. Our multiestablishment panel is more highly unionized and has larger establishments than the 1997 NCS as a whole. Jobs in our multiestablishment panel pay approximately 5% higher wages. 7 As one might expect, our multiestablishment panel has somewhat more employment in manufacturing and retail trade, and less in services, than the 1997 NCS cross section. The occupational distributions, however, are quite similar.
III. The Selection of Industries and Occupations for Diversified Firms
Our ultimate goal is to document the extent to which labor markets within large diversified firms appear to be similar. One reason labor markets may appear to be similar across business lines within a firm is that the firm chooses to enter industries with similar labor market characteristics. A firm may, for example, choose to enter only industries that use high-wage occupations. A firm may also choose to enter only industries with high industry effects, that is, industries 3 These are the same data used by the National Register Publishing Company to produce the annual publication Directory of Corporate Affiliations.
4 Excluded single-establishment firms may have additional establishments that were not sampled by the NCS.
5 Sampling within strata is done with probability proportionate to employment. Therefore, unweighted data give samples which are at least partly employment-weighted (the weights adjust mainly for nonresponse and differential probabilities of selection across strata). We obtain similar results when using weights. 6 We define nine major industry categories: mining; construction; durable manufacturing; nondurable manufacturing; transportation, communications, and utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services. All of our results are robust to grouping durable and nondurable manufacturing into one major industry. Finer industry categories within these major industries are based on the first three digits of the establishment's SIC industry code, and we term these "three-digit" industries. 7 The wage differential after controlling for occupation, industry, state, union status, and payroll date is approximately 4.3%. To analyze these issues, we regress log wages on industry and occupation effects, along with other covariates, using our multiestablishment panel of 34,746 jobs. We estimate
where y jk is the average of 1997 and 1998 log wages for job j in establishment k. The X jk are dummy variables for three-digit industry fixed effects, dummies for occupation fixed effects, and dummies for state, time, union, and full-time effects. For now we ignore error-term correlations across observations within the same firm; this issue forms the basis for much of our later analysis. Our immediate focus is on describing how similar chosen industries are within a diversified firm. We do so by assigning to each establishment its three-digit industry effect and its industry's employment-weighted average-occupation effect, and comparing those effects across the different parts of the diversified firm. 8 The industry's average-occupation effect is a summary measure of the industry's occupational content, and it at least partly measures the average level of skill in each industry. The interpretation of the industry effects themselves is more controversial, but they too may partly reflect skill differences. We do not want our results in this section to be driven by the fact that firms typically enter similar industries. We therefore restrict the analysis to the 258 firms operating in more than one major industry. We divide each multiindustry firm into two parts: the major industry with the most employment in our sample, and the rest of the firm. We then average (weighting by employment) the three-digit industry effects and the industry-average occupational content measures for both parts of the firm. A typical comparison in this section is, for example, a firm with one business line in services and one business line in durable manufacturing. Will the business lines tend to be in industries with similar occupational distributions (both high-skill or both low-skill industries)? Will they tend to have similar values for their fixed industry effects? The answer to these questions, to anticipate results, is yes.
We first examine whether firms tend to enter industries with similar occupational distributions. At this point, we are ignoring the wages these particular firms pay, and we are ignoring the occupational distributions these firms choose. All we are analyzing now is whether firms choose to enter industries with, on average, similar occupational distributions. Figure 2 plots the industry-average occupational content measure from each part of a diversified firm against the similar construct for the other part.
As is evident from figure 2, firms have a tendency to enter industries with similar values of average occupational effects. The correlation coefficient for figure 2 is 0.44. Even across major industries, it appears as if there is a benefit of uniting industries with similar skill levels under the same firm. Perhaps these results reflect skill complementarities or common technologies that cross major industry boundaries. Other explanations are also possible. Clearly, however, a pattern exists in the types of industries diversified firms choose to enter. Figure 3 performs a similar exercise for the fixed-industry effects. We plot the employment-weighted average of fixedindustry effects for firm's largest major industry against this same measure for the rest of the firm. 9 Figure 3 therefore examines whether firms tend to choose industries that pay similar levels after controlling for the occupational distri-8 Equation (1) partitions industry wage differences into components due to industry differences in occupations, industry differences in other observed factors, and unexplained industry differences in wages. Averaging the estimated components of equation (1) over observations in the same three-digit industry gives this partition. 9 The average of fixed effects within a major industry may come from one or many three-digit industries. 
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butions of these industries. Of course, these fixed-industry effects may simply capture skill levels that are observable to the firms but are unobservable to us. They may also reflect pay differences due to differing contracting environments (efficiency wages, for example). 10 The picture in figure 3 looks similar to that in figure 2. After controlling for the occupational distributions within industries, firms tend either to enter high-wage industries or to enter low-wage industries, but tend not to enter highwage and low-wage industries simultaneously. 11 The correlation coefficient of these two series is 0.43.
Taken together, figures 2 and 3 tell us that, even across major industries, firms tend to enter industries with similar labor market characteristics. 12 We are also interested, however, in the choices firms make after they decide to enter an industry. One such choice is the occupational distribution actually chosen by the firm, which may differ from industry norms. We can easily use the estimates from equation (1) to construct a summary measure of each firm's occupational profile compared to the norms of the industries in which the firm operates.
Specifically, we calculate the employment-weighted average of the fixed occupation effects for the occupations chosen by each firm within each three-digit industry. We then subtract off the industry mean, and aggregate this value for the largest major industry in each firm and the rest of each firm. The result is a measure of whether the firm uses high-wage occupations, conditional on the three-digit industries the firm enters. As it turns out, the occupational choices of firms once industry norms are netted out are somewhat related across the firms' different major-industry divisions. The correlation is positive, but the correlation coefficient is only 0.13. We view this as only weak evidence of a systematic pattern across major industries in occupational choices relative to industry norms.
We have made other calculations that support the general finding of a relationship between the industries that multiindustry firms choose to enter. For example, when these firms operate in multiple three-digit industries within the same major industry, the three-digit industries tend to be either high-wage or low-wage (but not both) relative to the major industry average. This general finding is important in that it indicates that establishments in multiindustry firms have wages that are related along some observable dimensions, in this case industry and occupation. That raises an interesting corollary question: are wages in different establishments related, after netting out the effects of observables?
IV. An Empirical Wage Model
Our strategy to study whether wages are related across establishments within a firm, even after netting out observables, is to specify a model with several error components that correspond to the different hierarchical levels of a firm. The variances of these error components tell us how strongly wages (net of observables) are correlated within a firm across various hierarchical boundaries.
To keep the exposition simple, we present a wage model with only two levels of hierarchy: the firm and the establishment within the firm. Our main results all take into account one or two additional levels of hierarchy corresponding to three-digit industry affiliations within firms or major-industry affiliations within firms. Extending the model we present below to one with additional levels of hierarchy is straightforward.
Consider a wage determination model of the form
where y ijkt is the log wage for job k in establishment j in firm i in year t, and X ijkt are covariates. As in equation (1), the covariates are fixed state, fixed three-digit industry, and fixed occupation effects, union status, full-time status, and month of the wage observation (interacted with year). The fixed effects, which we analyzed in section III, are treated as nuisance parameters here. We are primarily interested in estimating the variances of the error components. Because we are interested in describing wage levels as well as wage changes, we posit time-varying and permanent variance components. , respectively. We will identify the time-varying components from firstdifference models, and the permanent variance components from average log wage models. 13 For instance, the firm error component variance from a first-difference equation corresponds to 2 2 , and the firm error component variance from an average log wage equation corresponds to 2 ϩ ( 2 /2). Given estimates for the error variances, we can derive wage correlations of interest, net of the fixed controls. Define ỹ ijkt ϵ y ijkt Ϫ X ijkt ␤ t , which is the difference between the log wage for the job cell and the log wage we would expect from the covariates alone. We can then express the wage correlation between any two jobs as a function of the estimated variances. According to our model of wage determination, for example, the correlation of ỹ ijkt between two jobs within the same establishment in the same time period equals
which is the total variance of the common components divided by the total variance of all components. The numerator reflects firm error components (permanent and timevarying) and establishment error components (permanent and time-varying), but omits the job cell components' variances 2 and 2 , because two different jobs in the same establishment would not share common draws from the distribution of those components. As another example, consider two log wage draws coming from the same firm, but different establishments and different years. In this case, the correlation is
because the two observations only share a permanent firm effect. We are interested in models with as complete a hierarchical specification as possible. In particular, effects common to different establishments might be larger when the establishments are in similar industries than when they are in dissimilar ones. For this reason we estimate models that have industry-within-firm effects in addition to those given in equation (2). We also include major-industry-within-firm effects when possible, but at times this additional parameter cannot be estimated. Our main constraint, aside from computational issues, is that there is relatively limited crossindustry variation within firms.
We follow a suggestion of Groshen (1991) and estimate these models through restricted maximum likelihood (REML). The REML approach transforms the data to eliminate the fixed (X␤) effects and estimates the error components with maximum likelihood. 14 REML's main drawback is that it invokes the random-effects assumption that the X controls are orthogonal to the error components. Its main advantage is that it estimates the variance components more efficiently than fixed-effects methods (Baltagi, Song, & Jung, 2001) . That practical consideration is paramount in our application, due to the data's limited cross-industry variation within firms. 15
V. Empirical Results
Before turning to our main results in this section, we first try to assess the magnitudes of the firm-side components of wages and employment changes. One way to do this is to compare adjusted R 2 statistics in regressions with and without establishment fixed effects. We estimate models of the average of 1997 and 1998 log wages for each job cell as well as models of the change in log wages from 1997 to 1998 and models of the percentage change in employment for the job cell. 16 All models include the same fixed effects as the model estimated in equation (1).
In the wage-change model, the adjusted R 2 rises from 0.03 to 0.13 with the inclusion of fixed establishment effects in a model with fixed effects for union status, month of observation, state, three-digit occupation, and three-digit industry. The same exercise results in the adjusted R 2 rising from 0.81 to 0.86 in the average-wage model, and from 0.02 to 0.14 in the employment-change model.
We believe the results on the adjusted R 2 results above show that the magnitudes of employer-level heterogeneity are large enough to warrant study. We now turn to allocating these within-establishment correlations to various levels of firm hierarchy. Table 3 contains our wage decomposition for our entire multiestablishment panel. In particular, table 3 decomposes wages into permanent and time-varying components at the establishment level, at the firm within three-digit industry level, at the firm within major-industry level, and at the firmwide level. The top panel of the table shows the wagechange and average-wage models. The middle panel transforms these estimates into variance estimates of the components in equation (2), and decomposes the withinestablishment and within-year correlation into each of its eight components. The bottom panel shows the wage correlations between different jobs implied by the variance components.
A. Wages
Looking first at the wage-change results, we see that wage changes are essentially uncorrelated outside the establishment. The average-wage results, however, show that wage levels contain significant components at all four levels of the hierarchy. That is, wage levels are correlated across all jobs and establishments within a diversified firm, but 14 Suppose in matrix form Y ϭ X␤ ϩ ε, where X has dimensionality N ϫ k, and ε ϳ N(0,⍀) is the composite error term incorporating the relevant variance components. Find any matrix ⌳ with dimensions N ϫ (N Ϫ k) and with full column rank such that ⌳ЈX ϭ 0, and transform the model as ⌳ЈY ϭ ⌳Јε ϳ N(0, ⌳Ј⍀⌳). Maximum likelihood applied to this transformed data yields REML estimates of the covariance parameters. The resulting variance parameter estimates are consistent and invariant to ␤ and the choice of the matrix ⌳. The regression coefficients may be recovered with a second-stage feasible GLS regression. See Searle, Casella, and McCulloch (1992) for more details. 15 Other practical reasons for adopting REML rather than a fixed-effects estimator include the facts that REML guarantees nonnegative variance estimates and generates standard errors as a byproduct. In addition, REML is computationally simpler than estimating the untransformed model with maximum likelihood. 16 We define the percentage change in employment for the job cell as the change in job-cell employment from 1997 to 1998, divided by the average of 1997 and 1998 employment. they are more highly correlated when the job cells are more closely related in the firm's organizational structure.
Looking at the middle panel, we see that only 2% of the within-establishment wage correlation comes from timevarying components, almost all of which comes from the random-establishment effects. Approximately one-third of the contribution of the permanent components comes from establishment effects, with the other three components making significant contributions as well.
In the bottom panel of table 3 we see, for both wage levels and wage changes, our estimated correlations for job cells within a firm. As should be expected, wage changes are only correlated to any significant degree when the job cells are in the same establishment, whereas wage levels are correlated throughout an entire firm. 17 Table 3 shows that wage levels within firms are correlated across major industries. It is unclear whether this correlation is due to wage policies or due to unobservable productivity characteristics of the employees, but the labor markets within diversified firms once again appear to be related. Firms not only choose to enter industries with similar characteristics (as shown in figures 2 and 3), but also adopt similar wage policies or hiring policies across industries after entry. 18 One potential weakness of the results in table 3 is that, by modeling the correlations with random effects, we must assume that the random effects are uncorrelated with the fixed covariates of the model. Techniques do exist that could estimate these correlations from models that do not include random effects, and that therefore would not assume that these effects are uncorrelated with the model's other covariates, but these techniques result in inefficient estimators for our data structure. 19 To address this potential weakness in a simpler manner, we carry out a REML estimation of average log wages on our controls plus fixed-firm effects, with random effects for major industry within firm, three-digit industry within firm, and establishment. That is, we replace firm random effects with firm dummy variables, in order to test their joint significance. After estimating the variance-covariance matrix with REML, we estimate the fixed effects using FGLS. An F-test easily rejects the null hypothesis that the fixed firm effects are all zero. This F-test of the fixed effects recognizes that the observations from the same firm and major industry are correlated, particularly if they are from the same three-digit industry or the same establishment. The main conclusion from table 3 that wage levels are correlated throughout the firm still holds, even though we have allowed the firm effects to be correlated with the other covariates. 20 To summarize our results on wages, we find that wage levels are correlated across establishments and industries within large diversified firms. Wage changes are essentially uncorrelated across establishments within these firms. What should we conclude from these results?
Our results for wage changes are possibly measurementrelated. The wage measure may omit some forms of compensation with cross-establishment commonalities (in Models are estimated using restricted maximum likelihood, and include fixed effects for union status, full-time status, month of observation, state, three-digit industry, and three-digit Census occupation code. The reported estimates are 100 times the actual estimated variances to avoid leading zeros. In the wage-change model, the estimated variance of the random effect for major industry within firm is 0 (the boundary). All other estimates in the wage-change model impose that the variance of the major-industry within-firm random effect is 0. All correlations are of the components of log wages (or changes in log wages) that are not explained by the fixed effects. The wage-level correlations in the final panel assume wage draws from the same year.
changes), such as annual bonuses or pension contributions. Another possibility is that our period of analysis is simply too short. Wage changes across establishments within firms might be correlated if we could observe changes over a longer period of time.
Our results on wage levels can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that certain firms, across all business lines, simply pay their employees more than these same employees could receive in other firms. That is, our results are not driven by our inability to control fully for employee heterogeneity. If this explanation is correct, one possible economic interpretation is rent sharing. That is, large firms that are particularly profitable share these rents with all of their employees. It is worth wondering, however, if the rents generated by one profitable division of a diverse firm would be shared with employees in unrelated divisions. 21 The second possibility is that certain firms, across all business lines, choose high-skilled people in all occupations in ways that we cannot observe. The model of Acemoglu (1999) , which incorporates the rent-sharing interpretation of the previous paragraph, may provide an additional economic interpretation for our results. In this model, firms first make decisions on capital investment. Based on these investment decisions, each firm decides whether it will recruit high-skilled workers or all workers. If one believes that these capital decisions (or some other firmwide decisions) could affect the desired (unobservable) skill level throughout a diverse firm, wage levels would appear to be correlated throughout the firm across business lines. Table 4 presents a REML estimation of an employmentchange model with random establishment effects, threedigit industry effects, and random firm effects. 22 Our employment change measure is the change in job-cell employment from 1997 to 1998, divided by the average of 1997 and 1998 employment. Note first that employment growth at the job-cell level is uncorrelated across three-digit industries. Note next that, although employment growth is correlated across establishments within a three-digit industry within a firm, the estimated variance of random establishment effects dwarfs that of the random three-digitindustry within-firm effects. Note lastly that the variance of the residual is easily the largest variance estimated.
B. Employment Growth
We interpret these results as an extension of the recent lessons in the job creation and destruction literature. 23 Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) and others have shown that churning of employment is high in both strong and weak economies. That is, significant establishment-level expansions occur when an industry is contracting overall, and significant establishment-level contractions occur when an industry is expanding overall.
Our estimates show that even when a particular business line within a firm grows, a high percentage of individual establishments are likely to contract. For example, even when a business line receives a three-digit-industry withinfirm random effect that is 2 standard deviations above 0, an establishment that receives a random establishment effect of just 1 standard deviation below 0 has a tendency to contract. Note further that this analysis does not rely at all on residual variance, which would only lend further credence to this argument.
This last point highlights one benefit of using job-level data to analyze employment growth at the establishment level. Some portion of the variance of the residual term in table 4 probably captures job-cell-level shocks that are unrelated to productivity. An employee might leave the establishment unexpectedly even if the establishment's manager had no intention of reducing employment. Employment fluctuations due to these job-cell-level shocks affect our residual (job cell) variance, but do not affect the other variances in table 4 .
Suppose now that we only observed employment at the establishment level, as is common in the literature. We could estimate models with random firm effects, random three-digit industry within-firm effects, and random establishment effects, but our estimated variance of random establishment effects would incorporate job-cell-level shocks in addition to the establishmentwide shocks. In this respect, our estimated variance of random establishment effects in table 4 has a cleaner interpretation than would an estimated variance of a random establishment effect from a data set with only establishment (rather than job-cell) employment. 21 Interesting in this regard are studies of cross-subsidization within the firm; see Berger and Ofek (1995) , Chevalier (2000) , and Lamont (1997) . 22 Random firm by major-industry effect estimates consistently hit the boundary of 0 when included in the employment change models, meaning that we cannot distinguish between the random effects within and between major industries.
23 Employment-change models yielded similar results when estimated separately for union and nonunion jobs, as did models estimated separately for white-collar and non-white-collar jobs. The model is estimated using restricted maximum likelihood, and includes fixed effects for union status, full-time status, month of observation, state, three-digit industry, and three-digit Census occupation code. The reported estimates are 100 times the actual estimated variances, to avoid leading zeros. All correlations are of the components of employment changes that are not explained by the fixed effects.
To illustrate this point empirically, we estimate a model of employment growth at the establishment level in table 5. That is, our dependent variable is the percentage change in total establishment employment, including jobs that were not specifically sampled in the NCS. Note that our estimated variances of random firm effects and random three-digitindustry within-firm effects are similar to those in table 4. The variance of the random establishment effect (the residual) is, as hypothesized, larger than the variance of the random establishment effect in table 4 (more than twice as large). We therefore find that more than half of the establishmentlevel heterogeneity found in establishment-level employment changes comes from job-cell-specific shocks. Using occupationlevel data in table 4, we are able to separate out these job-cellspecific shocks, which arguably are less related to productivity than are establishmentwide shocks.
VI. Conclusions
Diversified firms have establishments in different locales, with different occupational mixes, which operate in different industries. We use a unique data set that links labormarket information across establishments and business lines for these diversified firms, to investigate, for the first time in the literature, the degree to which labor markets appear uniform throughout these diversified firms. We find the following:
1. Industries that employ high-wage occupations tend not to be linked under the same firm with industries that employ low-wage occupations. 2. Industries that pay high wages (after controlling for occupational distributions and other covariates) tend not to be linked under the same firm with industries that pay low wages. 3. Controlling for industry and occupation effects, wage levels are correlated across establishments and across major industries within diversified firms. 4. Wage changes are essentially uncorrelated across establishments within a firm.
5. Job-level employment changes are uncorrelated across three-digit industries within a firm. 6. Job-level employment changes are correlated across establishments within a three-digit industry within a firm, but establishment-specific shocks are much more important determinants of job-level employment changes.
Our analysis is limited, however, by a few key factors. One is the inability to capture measures of individual ability, either explicitly with direct controls or implicitly by following individual workers over time. A second limitation is the short time period of the analysis. A final difficulty is the data's limited number of firms that operate in multiple industries. In future work we plan to utilize matched employeremployee data, as well as additional NCS data, to address these limitations. One important objective will be to see if the wage changes of individual workers are correlated over longer time horizons than could be studied in the current paper.
Another important objective will be to see if wage levels are correlated across establishments within firms, even after controlling for fixed person effects. If the wage correlations remain after controlling for unobservable characteristics of the employees, a rent-sharing interpretation of our results would seem more plausible. If the wage correlations are eliminated after controlling for unobserved person characteristics, one might conclude that employee-recruiting policies are affected by firmwide decisions. The model is estimated using restricted maximum likelihood, and includes fixed effects for month of observation, state, and three-digit industry. The reported estimates are 100 times the actual estimated variances, to avoid leading zeros. All correlations are of the components of employment changes that are not explained by the fixed effects.
